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C O M M E N T ARY
DIS C O UNTING WITHIN TH E GAMBLING C ONTEXT
Gregory J. Madden
University of Kansas
____________________

Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino argue that
high rate delay discounting may be correlated
with pathological gambling not because of
factors at work within the gambling context,
but because of discounting of the delayed,
diffuse benefits of gambling abstinence. Although I agree that the discounting of events
outside the gambling context probably affect
the probability of gambling, I will argue below that events occurring within the gambling
context would also be expected to predispose
high-rate discounters toward problem gambling. The authors make four arguments regarding discounting and gambling. I will restrict my comments to the first two.

commodities that have been used in human
delay discounting experiments). This is an
interesting prediction worthy of empirical investigation. Until those data are collected, a
thought experiment will have to suffice.
Consider two casinos. One in which you
can wager and win money and another in
which you can wager cigarettes on the chance
of winning packs, cartons, or cases of your
preferred brand of cigarettes. Obviously, the
only people interested in gambling in the latter casino will be smokers who tend to discount delayed cigarettes at a higher rate than
comparable amounts of delayed money (e.g.,
Mitchell, 1999). Accordingly, Fantino and
Stolarz-Fantino would appear to predict that,
all else being equal, smokers would behave
more impulsively (i.e., wager more and longer) in the cigarette casino than in the monetary casino. And what if the two casinos were
side by side? Which casino would the smokers be more likely to enter and engage in more
gambling? Presumably Fantino and StolarzFantino would predict that because of higher
rates of discounting delayed cigarettes, the
smokers would impulsively choose to gamble
cigarettes rather than money. However, given
a choice between the two casinos, I would be
surprised to see anyone enter the cigarette casino.
A larger point about how discounting
rates may interact with factors in the gambling context will be developed below, but for
now let us briefly consider why the monetary
__________

H UMANS DIS C O UNT MONEY LE SS
THAN OTH ER C OMMO DITIE S.

Citing evidence that humans discount delayed monetary rewards at a lower rate than
non-monetary rewards, the authors would
seem to predict that humans would make
more self-control choices in a traditional
gambling context, than in other settings where
the rewards are not monetary. Thus, gambling
should be more likely to occur when the items
wagered and won are nonmonetary items such
as food, health, or cigarettes (to name a few
_________
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casino might be favored over the cigarette casino (the answer may have little to do with
delay discounting but it is interesting nonetheless). One hypothesis was provided by a recent episode of the television show F amily
Guy (a program I abhor, but my son enjoys
immensely). In the episode, the father character, Peter, wins a lottery and proclaims that he
is going to take his family out for the best
meal of their lives. In the next scene, Peter
and family are in their car at the drive-up
window of a fast food restaurant. Peter is ordering vast quantities of the hamburgers they
eat on a regular basis. This is humorous because only a fool, like Peter, would waste a
windfall of cash on more of the same.
The scene illustrates that an apparent appeal of monetary gambling wins is that there
is a chance that you could hit the jackpot and,
if this unlikely event were to occur, it would
afford you the opportunity to purchase something normally out of reach (e.g., a trip to Europe or a new sports car). The same cannot be
said of a jackpot of cigarettes; more cigarettes
is more of the same. The relation between
large monetary wins and access to previously
unattainable luxuries was recently made explicit on an advertising billboard for a casino.
The billboard illustrated the transformation of
one of their customers from a hamburgereating commoner to a lobster-eating aristocrat. Perhaps the possibility of this transformation underlies the tendency for pathological gambling to be more prevalent among
lower SES populations (see review by Petry,
2005). With so many more luxury items out
of their reach, gambling on a low probability
of winning a monetary jackpot is the only
seemingly open road to aristocracy. Of course
these are speculations awaiting empirical
findings; findings I hope those taking a functional approach to the study of gambling will
pursue.

https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol2/iss2/9

VARIABLE AMO UNTS VS. VARIABLE
D ELAYS

Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino correctly
note that animals prefer variable delays and
response requirements over fixed delays/requirements, but less consistently prefer
variable reinforcer amounts over fixed
amounts. Thus, variable amounts, which are
characteristic of gambling wins, should not
increase the appeal of gambling. However, as
just noted, for humans, a monetary jackpot
provides access to previously unattainable
luxury items. Perhaps laboratory animals
would prefer variable reinforcer amounts if,
when they occasionally hit the jackpot, it provided access to a qualitatively different reinforcer – one that can only be obtained by
choosing the variable reinforcer alternative.
This may more closely model human gambling wins and may yield more systematic
preferences for variable reinforcers.
A second component of the Fantino and
Stolarz-Fantino argument is that we might
expect gambling to maintain more behavior
than predictable sources of income if human
gambling was characterized by variable delays, but it is not. When one gambles, there
are minimal delays between placing the bet
and winning or losing. Thus, strictly speaking,
Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino are correct about
gambling not involving variable delays. However, if one conceptualizes the time between
the initiation of a gambling episode (i.e., a
series of wagers) and an eventual win as a delay (e.g., Rachlin, 1990), then the delay to the
next win is quite variable. If this conceptualization has merit, then there should be a relation between the rate at which delayed rewards are discounted and the value of gambling wins.
How increased impulsivity may put one
at risk of problem gambling due to factors in
the gambling context has been outlined in two
separate theories. According to string theory
(Rachlin, 1990), gamblers take an accounting
of the discounted expected value of a string of
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Figure 1. Hyperbolic discounting functions obtained by setting the free parameter ( k) in Equation 1 to the values shown in each panel. The horizontal dashed line in each panel gives the overall discounted value of a gamble
with a 1 in 100 chance of winning (amount constant from win to win). The solid point in each panel shows the discounted value of a comparable win obtained after the 100 th “gamble” every time.

gambling events following each win. The delay to this gambling win is the time separating
the initiation of the string of gambles and the
eventual win. When a win occurs following a
single bet, the expected value of the win is not
discounted because it is not delayed. When a
win follows an extended string of losses,
however, the negative expected value is discounted in value because of the delay from
the beginning to the end of the string. If an
individual discounts delayed losses at a low
rate, then the negative expected value of delayed losses retain much of their negative value and outweigh the positive value of gambling wins that occasionally follow short
strings of bets (strings with positive expected
values). At higher discounting rates (in the
range characteristic of pathological gamblers),
the negative expected values associated with
long strings of losses are more heavily dis-
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counted and, therefore, are ineffective in inhibiting the decision to gamble. Thus, according
to the string theory of gambling, high-rate
discounting should predispose one toward pathological gambling. 1
The second theory of the relation between discounting events within the gambling
context and pathological gambling is based on
quantitative predictions of Mazur’s (1987)
hyperbolic discounting equation (Madden,
Ewan, & Lagorio, 2007). The hyperbolic
shape of the delay discounting function is
shown in both panels of Figure 1 and is given
by the following equation (Mazur, 1987):

1

According to string theory, very high discounting
rates are predictive of decreased gambling. However,
for this prediction to hold requires that discounting
rates be far higher than what has been reported thus far
in the human delay discounting literature.
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Vd 

A
1 kD

(1)

where A is the objective amount of the reinforcer obtained following delay D. The free
parameter k is a quantitative index of impulsivity, as it reflects the steepness of the function (i.e., how rapidly the reinforcer loses its
value as it becomes increasingly delayed).
Extensive empirical evidence shows that discounting of delayed outcomes by humans and
nonhumans is well described by Equation 1
(see review by Green & Myerson, 2004).
The upper panel of Figure 1 shows highrate discounting characteristic of pathological
gamblers (Petry 2001) and the lower panel
shows low rate discounting characteristic of
humans with no pathology (Kirby, 1997). If
the duration of the string of gambles is unpredictable, then so is the delay to a gambling
win; indeed, the obtained delay to the next
gambling win can occur at any value along
the x-axis of Figure 1 (and beyond). This
second account of the role of delay discounting in gambling focuses on the discounted
value of these unpredictably delayed gambling wins (not gambling losses). To calculate
the discounted value of gambling wins ( Vg),
we use the equation proposed by Mazur
(1989):
n
 A 

Vg   Pi 
(2)
i 1
 1  k Di 
where P i is the probability of experiencing
each delay ( D i) and k is the rate of delay discounting. A similar equation has been proposed for unpredictable work requirements,
like those arranged by random-ratio schedules
of reinforcement (Field, Tonneau, Ahearn, &
Hineline, 1996). These equations have been
empirically supported in experiments involving nonhuman subjects (e.g., Madden, Dake,
Mauel, & Rowe, 2005; Mazur, 1989).

https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol2/iss2/9

The horizontal dashed lines in Figure 1
show the percent of the present (discounted)
value of unpredictably delayed gambling wins
(Vg) given discounting rates characteristic of
pathological gamblers (upper panel) and nopathology humans (lower panel). These discounted values of the gambling wins were
obtained by a computer-simulated series of
200,000 gambling wins where the odds of
winning were 1 in 100 and the discounting
rate was set equal to that indicated in each
panel. Within the simulation, the number of
gambles made before each win provided the
value of D i , and the probability of winning
following D gambles (P i ) was empirically obtained for each value of D in the simulation.
The solid data point within each panel shows
the discounted value of a comparable reward
reliably delivered following the 100th “gamble”. This predictable delay to a win is equal
to the average obtained delay of the 200,000
gambling wins; thus, any difference in the
discounted values of the predictable and unpredictable wins is not due to a difference in
obtained delay.
In the upper panel of Figure 1, gambling
wins are discounted by approximately 75%,
but that is unimportant in the decision to
gamble or not. What is important is that gambling wins are worth nearly twice as much as
a predictably delayed reward of the same
magnitude. At this high rate of delay discounting the unpredictably delayed gamblinglike reward retains more value and should be
strongly preferred over the predictable outcome which may more closely model the
more predictable monetary rewards obtained
by humans (e.g., regular paychecks). In the
lower panel, the discounted values of gambling and non-gambling outcomes are approximately equivalent because the hyperbolic
discounting function is shallow and closely
approximates linearity. Thus, at low rates of
discounting, gambling-like rewards have no
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Figure 2. Percentage increase in discounted value that is obtained by selecting unpredictably delayed over
fixed delayed rewards. As the degree of delay discounting increases ( k), the gambling-like rewards increase in value
relative to the predictable rewards. Note that the reward amounts and average time to the reward are constant across
gambling and non-gambling rewards.

greater value than predictable rewards and
thus gambling should have no untoward appeal.
Equation 2 may be used to predict how
much the value of gambling-like wins will
increase over predictably delayed nongambling rewards as a function of increases in
the degree of delay discounting (k in Equation
2). This predicted relation is shown in Figure
2. At k-values of 0.001 (typical of humans
without a pathology) nothing is to be gained
by gambling (% increase = -0.3). However, at
k-values of 0.03 and above (the range reported for pathological gamblers by Alessi &
Petry, 2003) the individual experiences at
least a 50% increase in subjective reward value by choosing to gamble. Thus, Equation 2
predicts that, all else being equal, higher delay
discounting rates are predictive of stronger
preferences for gambling-like rewards.
If factors occurring in the gambling context combine with high rates of delay discounting to render gambling wins more valuable (Madden et al., 2007) and/or strings of
losses less costly (Rachlin, 1990), then when
combined with greater discounting of the
benefits of delayed gambling abstinence,
high-rate delay discounting should be predic-
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tive of increased rates of pathological gambling. Although we have learned much by
studying correlations between delay discounting and addicted populations, further animal
research is needed to determine if we can experimentally manipulate rates of delay discounting (e.g., Mazur & Logue, 1978) and, if
so, if this affects the subsequent development
of socially relevant behavior such as drug
self-administration and preferences for gambling-like outcomes. I, like Fantino and Stolarz-Fantino, look forward to the results of
this functional approach to the study of gambling.
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